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A B S T R A C T   
In the aftermath of a nuclear or radiological accident, an extended mapping of reliable dose rate values is of key 
importance for any governmental decision and countermeasures. Presently, numerous dosimetry network sta-
tions, operated by the national governments of the member states in Europe, provide such dose rate data on an 
hourly basis. Nevertheless, there are large areas in Europe that are not covered at all by these early warning 
networks and other areas that show only a low density of governmental network stations. Hence, there may be a 
significant lack of information in case of a nuclear or radiological emergency. As a consequence of the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant accidents in 2011, a number of non-governmental radiation monitoring networks 
(NRMN) appeared on the internet, providing dose rate data based on stationary as well as on mobile measure-
ments of ionizing radiation by laypersons. Especially the mobile detectors are able to cover large areas in short 
time. Therefore, it is of considerable importance to investigate the feasibility of using dose rate data from non- 
governmental networks as a complementary input to the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform 
(EURDEP). Within the European Metrology Program for Innovation and Research (EMPIR), the project 16ENV04 
“Preparedness” has studied the metrological relevance of such non-governmental dose rate data (also called 
crowd-sourced radiological monitoring) in the most comprehensive way so far. Sixteen different dose rate de-
tector systems (in general 4 of each type, plus 2 types with 2 detectors, i.e. 68 detectors in total) used in NRMN 
have been investigated for the reliability of their data and the corresponding networks, and their data provision 
to the public were analyzed. The most relevant performance parameters of dosimetry systems (detector’s 
inherent background, energy dependence and linearity of the response as well as the response to secondary 
cosmic radiation, the sensitivity to small increases of the dose rate and finally the stability of the detector’s 
indication at various climatic conditions - temperature and humidity) have been investigated for fourteen 
representative types of non-governmental dose rate measuring instruments. Results of this comprehensive per-
formance study of the simple, light-weighted and cheap dose rate meters used in NRMN, and conclusions on the 
feasibility of using their data for governmental monitoring in case of a nuclear or radiological emergency are 
presented.   
1. Introduction 
As a consequence of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 and 
based on the Council Decision 87/600/Euratom, the European countries 
began to expand their radiological early warning networks. Today more 
than 5500 stations are in operation and provide data on an hourly basis 
to the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform (EURDEP) of the 
European Commission (EC) (Sangiorgi et al., 2020). EURDEP serves as 
the central automatic data management system for the radiological data 
of the early warning networks in Europe, operated by the EC Joint 
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Research Center in Ispra (Italy). The radiological data from the national 
European networks, especially the comprehensive map of ambient dose 
rate values, collected by EURDEP are available to the EC Member States 
but also to the general public. This information and its reliability are of 
key importance for any official decision on countermeasures in case of a 
nuclear or radiological emergency. 
After the nuclear accidents in Fukushima in 2011, various non- 
governmental radiation monitoring networks (NRMN) were estab-
lished in the scope of citizen science projects organized by private per-
sons or by manufacturers of dose rate meters. The measuring 
instruments used in the non-governmental networks (MINNs) are typi-
cally dose rate meters or counters based on Geiger Muller (GM) sensors. 
The networks operate as internet cloud servers that store data, either 
manually uploaded by their users or automatically transmitted by the 
MINNs. Finally, the dose rate data are visualized on a world map and 
published on web sites with open public access. The number of moni-
toring stations – in most cases equipped with commercially available, 
simple and cheap dose rate meters and run by private citizens worldwide 
at their homes or mobile (e.g. carried by private cars) - has continuously 
grown after the Fukushima accident. The persistent development of 
“Internet of Things” (IoT) technologies in combination with quick 
accessibility of the broad public to its achievements will presumably 
keep this trend going, especially in case of any upcoming nuclear or 
radiological event. 
The European joint research project 16ENV04 “Mobile detection of 
ionizing radiation following a nuclear or radiological incident” (shortly 
named “Preparedness”) (http://www.preparedness-e, 2020), (Neumaier 
et al., 2019), (V04 Preparedness and Publi, 2018), funded by the Eu-
ropean Metrology Program for Innovation and Research (EMPIR), star-
ted in 2017 with a duration of three years. The project’s main objectives 
are the development of reliable instrumentation and methods necessary 
in the field of radiation protection in the aftermath of a nuclear or 
radiological emergency to quickly provide quantitative data on the ac-
tivity concentrations and dose rate levels in contaminated areas after a 
severe release of radioactivity. In this context, the work package 
“Monitoring of ionizing radiation by non-governmental networks” of the 
project raises the question whether non-governmental networks may 
support and complement official dose rate data, like those provided by 
EURDEP, and evaluates the reliability of such crowd-sourced dose rate 
data based on a metrological approach. 
As a first step, a study of the currently existing non-governmental 
networks was performed (Iurlaro et al., 2018a), (Iurlaro et al., 2018b), 
(Sperandio et al., 2018), (Report 92 - Radiatio, 2015). Then the project 
partners PTB, NPL, ENEA and VINS selected representative MINNs that 
are currently available on the market to investigate the reliability of 
their dose rate data in terms of the ambient dose equivalent rate Ḣ*(10)
using the metrological facilities of the national metrology institutes and 
the designated institutions involved in the project. 
Finally, the partners tested 18 different MINN types under calibra-
tion laboratory conditions. The complete study intended to test the 
linearity and energy dependence of the response at the home facilities of 
the participating institutions. The remaining tests took place at PTB 
reference facilities in Brunswick (Germany) and were organized as an 
intercomparison campaign in June 2019, comprising all MINNs in the 
project. The intercomparison covered measurements of inherent back-
ground, response to secondary cosmic radiation (SCR), climatic test 
(influence of variation in air temperature and humidity) and detection of 
small dose rate changes caused by artificial gamma ray photon sources 
in the natural environment. 
This paper summarizes and discusses the various results of the most 
comprehensive and systematic study of the performance of MINNs. 
1.1. Non-governmental networks 
Civil usage of nuclear energy in power plants may pose, in case of 
accidents or serious incidents, a radiological risk to the population. In 
some countries, public concern has made authorities object to nuclear 
power completely (e. g. Denmark, Italy, Austria and Germany). This 
refusal process was first ignited by the catastrophic accident of Cher-
nobyl and later by the one of Fukushima, both resulting in a largely 
contaminated area where it will be dangerous to live in for decades due 
to the high levels of radiation caused by the relatively long half-life (e. g. 
30 years for Cs-137) of the radionuclides in the fallout. In other coun-
tries, a strong public interest in this subject can be perceived by the 
development of independent or non-governmental monitoring networks 
of radiation in the scope of citizen science. Residents of Japan, for 
example, have purchased thousands of dosimeters for their personal use 
and non-governmental organizations - for the first time in history - have 
begun taking measurements following the release of radionuclides and 
share these data with others (Report 92 - Radiatio, 2015). 
However, the nuclear power plants are not the only source of 
possible radioactive contaminations. Atomic weapon testing, medical, 
industrial and military use of ionizing radiation, nuclear waste storages, 
“dirty bombs” in the hands of terrorists, secondary exposure through 
contaminated persons are all examples for the release or distribution of 
radioactive material in the environment while contaminating an area, 
the food or drinking water supplies and threatening the safety of the 
population. The worldwide expansion of NRMNs may contribute sub-
stantially to the safety precautions in case of radiological accidents 
serving as an additional source of information for decision makers, 
depending on the quality of these data. 
In the framework of the project 16ENV04 “Preparedness” a survey of 
currently existing global NRMNs has been conducted and the results can 
be found in (Iurlaro et al., 2018a), (Iurlaro et al., 2018b), (Sperandio 
et al., 2018). Additional general aspects regarding data provision, MINN 
operations and data safety in the NRMNs will be discussed in the 
following. 
One such aspect is the spatial limitation of the provided data. A 
measurement by a fixed monitoring station in the NRMN provides only 
information on dose rates at its local position with receptivity of a few 
meters around it and hundreds of km between the stations. Moreover, 
the horizontal distribution of the radioactive fallout can depend on the 
local ground topography and weather conditions. Rain, wind and hill-
slopes can create inhomogeneities in the distribution of radioactive 
contaminations (Wallbrink and Murray, 1993), (Komissarov and Ogura, 
2017), (Chartin et al., 2017). This dynamic process can lead to a redis-
tribution or migration of the initial fallout depending on the type of the 
initial deposition (wet or dry) (Basuki et al., 2020), (Bonnett, 1990), soil 
properties (Poreba et al., 2003), vegetation (Bunzl et al., 1989), (Livens 
et al., 1992) and land use (Gonze and Calmon, 2017), (Yoshimura et al., 
2016). 
Another aspect is the lack of data protection from being faked. False 
data can be produced in two ways depending on the kind of data 
transmission to the server. If manually uploaded to the network server, 
the operator of the station has unlimited access to the measured data. 
The protocol files have either simple txt, csv or xlsx (MS Excel) format 
and can easily be edited or created. MINNs which send the data auto-
matically can be manipulated to generate high dose rate data by placing 
a gamma source close to it. 
Finally, the origin and independence of the NRMN data is not always 
clear. Some NRMN argue for using input data verification mechanisms 
that prevent the upload of malicious data (Brown et al., 2016). The 
network operators are best positioned to verify uploaded data, but even 
in this case it is the individual who decides what data will be made 
public on the map. 
Some efforts have been made to calibrate and validate indications of 
the instruments used in the SAFECAST network (Coletti et al., 2017), 
(Hultquist and Cervone, 2018), but most of the currently existing 
NRMNs have no descriptions or recommendations of the exact mea-
surement procedure. Unfortunately, the operators have no possibility of 
specifying the procedure they use to carry out the measurements or to 
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describe peculiarities (buildings, forest, water etc.) of the location. 
However, the knowledge of the height and orientation of the detector 
and information about the environment can be very helpful for data 
interpretation or analysis. 
Surely, the current state is only a snapshot of the development of the 
NRMNs as a branch of IoT and citizen science. Safety issues, compara-
bility and reliability of the delivered information are important aspects 
of this development and will ensure the use of this instrument for critical 
official decisions. 
1.2. Instruments used in non-governmental networks 
The main active users of NRMNs are civilians who are in possession 
of relatively simple counters, dose or dose rate meters available at 
internet shops. The devices in this study are equipped with different 
Geiger-Müller (GM) sensor types. Relatively simple built-in electronics 
ensures the operation and reading of the sensor and the processing of the 
counting statistics. The GM tubes are not energy compensated in any of 
the investigated MINN types. Plastic or aluminum serves as housing 
material for the MINNs with some of them do not even have a housing. 
The calculation of the dose rate is mostly done by multiplication of the 
count rate by a conversion factor without details about the origin of its 
value. Finally, the MINN types and the used GM sensors, whose prop-
erties have been investigated in this study, are listed in Table 1. 
The different MINN types are anonymized by assigning random 
numbers (in a set of 1–18) to each MINN type which are consistent in all 
results throughout this work. Each MINN type is represented by four 
(1–9, 11–16 and 18) or two (10 and 17) individual dose rate meters with 
equivalent electronic components. 
The GM sensor is the essential part of a dose rate meter whose 
behavior dominantly defines the main MINN characteristics. For com-
parison purpose, five categories of installed GM tubes with distinctive 
constructive traits were defined. As such, the shape and material of the 
GM tube walls, gas mixture and the number of sensors were selected: 
Stainless steel and glass are the materials often utilized as GM tube 
walls. “Short” and “long” describe the tube’s shape with the lengths in 
the range of 2.5 cm–3.5 cm and 7 cm to 10.5 cm, respectively. Their 
diameters are comparable. “Pancake” has a cylindrical shape with the 
diameter much larger than the height. Category V is divided into two 
subcategories: a) a combination of two GM tubes with identical length 
and metal walls; b) a combination of a long and a short GM tube with 
glass capsules. These categorizations will allow us to analyze the test 
results with the knowledge of the constructive characteristics of the GM 
tubes used. 
In this work, the focus will be on the MINN’s performance in gamma 
and X-ray photon fields. Thus, the presence of an entry window in some 
GM tubes intended for the detection of alpha and beta radiation is of less 
importance. Moreover, devices with selectable measurement modes are 
set up for the detection of gamma radiation only. Note, that in this mode 
the measurement of dose rate in some X-ray fields is also possible. 
At the time of the publication the tests of the response to changes of 
the ambient climatic conditions for the MINN types 5, 6, 11, 15 have not 
been completed due to organizational issues (limited access to the 
working place and to the testing facilities) in combination with the 
worldwide pandemic COVID-19 situation. Those results and the results 
of the environmental tests, which have been conducted in June 2019 in 
the framework of the MINN intercomparison at PTB facilities, for the 
MINN type 6 will be published elsewhere. 
2. Experimental details and results 
2.1. General 
The reading of a MINN ĠMINN is made up of several components 
which can be differently pronounced depending on the physical prop-
erties of the detector system (materials and electronics) and on the ra-
diation field (energy, dose rate) (Wissmann, 2006), (Bossew et al., 
2017): 
ĠMINN = Ṁ + qterr⋅Ḣ
*
(10)ref , terr + qSCR⋅Ḣ
*




where q characterizes the sensitivity of the MINN to a photon field. 
Ḣ*(10)ref , terr, Ḣ
*
(10)ref , SCR and Ḣ
*
(10)ref , art are the reference ambient 
dose equivalent rates arising from radiation fields of terrestrial, sec-
ondary cosmic or artificial origin, respectively. The sensitivity of a de-
tector can be considered as nearly constant for the contributions 
originating from the natural radiation sources at a fixed location 
whereas the factor qart can strongly vary with energy and dose rate of the 
artificial radiation coming from “outside” depending on the source 
quality. This is due to the energy dependence of the interaction proba-
bility of the incident photons with the sensor and relatively long re-
covery periods from complete ionization in the sensor interior, i.e. long 
dead times. Moreover, MINN housings and sensor walls impose a critical 
reduction of the qart factor in the very low (<30 keV) photon energy 
region. Thus, the knowledge of the photon field properties might be 
essential for proper measurement of the ambient dose equivalent rate 
Ḣ*(10) when using MINNs with uncompensated GM sensor types. Ṁ 
represents the MINN reading in absence of any type of ionizing radia-
tion, also referred to as inherent background or self-effect of the mea-
surement instrument. In case of GM tubes where high voltage is applied 
to the gas volume, this effect is likely caused by spontaneous discharges 
due to a dielectric breakdown. 
Table 1 
The MINN types and GM sensors selected for testing in the framework of 
the EMPIR project “Preparedness”.  
MINN type GM tube type 
Gamma Scout LND 712 
Rad 100 LND 712 
RadAlert Monitor 200 LND 712 
Monitor 4 KIT LND 712 
μRAD Monitor A3 SI-29 BG 
GMC 500þ: SI-29 BG and M 4011 
Mazur PRM-7000 LND 713 
uRAD Monitor A3.4 SBM 20 
MyGeiger ver.3 pro SBM 20 
uRAD Monitor KIT1 SBM 20 
Radex RD 1212 BT SBM 20 
Soeks Quantum 2 x SBM 20-1 
Radex RD1706 2 x SBM 20-1 
Radex RD1503þ SBM 20-1 
GMC300Eþ M 4011 
GMC320þ M 4011 
bGeigie Nano LND 7317 
Inspector Alert V2 LND 7317  
Table 2 
GM tube categories of the investigated MINNs.  


































MINN type 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6 
7, 8, 9, 10, 
11 
12, 13 14, 15 a) 16, 17 
b) 18  
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2.2. Uncertainties 
In this study, the uncertainties were evaluated in accordance with 
the recommendations by GUM (International Organization for Stan-
dardization, 1995). Reference values served as a verification of the 
MINN measurement results. For inherent background, linearity and 
energy dependence tests, the traceable reference values including their 
uncertainties were provided by the facilities. At plume simulation and 
sensitivity to SCR tests the reference instruments calibrated and trace-
able to PTB primary standard were employed. Both MINN and reference 
results were obtained as the mean values of the repeated readout from 
the corresponding instrument, respectively. The acquisition times - the 
time interval for regular storage of the counter or dose rate meter values 
during permanent operation of the instrument-for MINNs and for the 
reference instruments were set to 1 min when possible. 
Readings from MINNs and from reference instruments were averaged 
within one continuous period of irradiation and the experimental stan-
dard deviation of the mean was calculated according to type A evalua-
tion described in (International Organization for Standardization, 
1995). In case when the subtraction of (inherent) background or a 
subsequent calculation (e. g. relative response) was performed the 
combined standard uncertainty for uncorrelated input quantities was 
calculated. 
For the representation of results by type, all mean values per MINN 
type were averaged. The type-related uncertainty was defined as the 
maximum of type An uncertainties assigned to the MINNs of the same 
type. The exception to this rule is the climatic test where only one MINN 
of each type participated. Consequently, the MINN type uncertainty was 
equated to the uncertainty of this MINN. 
All results are finally reported with expanded uncertainties with the 
coverage factor k = 2 or 95% level of confidence. 
2.3. Measurements of MINN’s inherent background 
2.3.1. General 
For the determination of the inherent background of the MINNs, a 
location with very low background radiation level is required. One of the 
PTB’s facilities (UDO II), established in a salt mine at a depth of about 
430 m underground, offers the testing environment with a constant 
background radiation as low as Ḣ*(10)UDOII, BG = (1.4 ±0.2) nSv h
− 1 
(Neumaier and Dombrowski, 2014), (Röttger and Kessler, 2019). This 
very low background radiation level mainly results from K-40 in the rock 
salt and a small contribution from the small amount of progeny of radon 
gas in air. The secondary cosmic radiation is reduced by more than 4 
orders of magnitude and hence negligible (Neumaier et al., 2000a). 
Using a “lead castle” construction inside the lab allows a further 
reduction of the background radiation level to only 
Ḣ*(10)UDOII, ˝lead castle˝ ≈ 0.1 nSv h
− 1. A preliminary test showed no dif-
ference between the measurements of the inherent background of some 
selected MINNs surrounded by or without the “lead castle” construction. 
Consequently, the inherent background of all MINNs was determined by 
placing them on the tables in the underground laboratory room. 
Under these conditions, the MINNs are expected to display values 
related to their own noise of the installed GM tube, electronic compo-
nents and built-in computation algorithm. Equation (1) has here the 
form: 
ĠMINN = Ṁ. (2) 
Moreover, the underground lab provides a photon calibration facility 
with various gamma sources (Am-241, Cs-137, Co-57, Co-60, sealed Ra- 
226 in equilibrium with its progeny) which can be used to generate 
collimated photon fields with ambient dose equivalent rate values of a 
few tens up to a few hundreds of nSv h− 1 traceable to PTB primary 
standards. 
2.3.2. Results 
The MINNs were subjected to an environment with extremely low 
radiation level at UDOII for about 4 h. This time period results in a 
relative uncertainty of about 7% which arises from counting statistics for 
the smallest observed averaged MINN reading of 1 cpm (1 count per 
minute). The reference value (solid line) of the facility background 
Ḣ*(10)BG, UDOII has been subtracted from the mean values of the MINN 
readings. The results of these measurements are shown in the plot of 
Fig. 1. 
One finds that in most cases the measured inherent background for 
individual MINNs corresponds with the average inherent background of 
the MINN type (within measurement uncertainty) with the exception of 
the types 2 and 13, where one value is significantly different from the 
other three, and the type 3 where two values are significantly different. 
Due to the small size of the sample (only 4 MINNs of the same type), it is 
not possible to know whether this deviation was typical for the type or 
caused by possible variations in the characteristics of the electronic parts 
(sensor, high voltage or readout electronics) or a device failure. How-
ever, the MINN type mean value calculated using all MINNs representing 
the type will be applied for calculations throughout this work. 
The MINN type mean values demonstrate a significant scatter of the 
investigated parameter, however, there is always a clear elevation of the 
MINN self-effect over Ḣ*(10)UDOII, BG . The possible causes can be either a 
considerable variation in the GM sensor’s own noise or instability of the 
electronics or the kind of data processing implemented in the MINN, e.g. 
subtraction from the measured quantity (cps, cpm or Ḣ*(10)) of a con-
stant value attributed to an inherent background. 
By means of the categories defined in Table 2, one finds that the 
MINN types 1- 6with the small GM tubes (category I) show the lowest 
inherent background values. In contrast, the types 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 
13 with GM tubes of the categories II and III almost all demonstrate a 
similar increase of the inherent background values except for the type 9. 
The outstandingly large self-effect of the type 9 could be explained by 
less stable electronics for high voltage supply or by the type of data 
processing. The MINN types with the sensor of category IV have a 
comparably larger volume of GM tubes and demonstrate low self-effect, 
instead. Surprisingly, the MINN types of the category V a) and b) have 
their inherent backgrounds comparable with those of category II; even 
though their GM sensors are of the same type, however differing in the 
number. The MINN types 10 and 17 were represented only by two units. 
They lack an automatic data acquisition and have been read out by the 
eye in a 10-min tact. The comparably smaller data samples from both 
dose rate meters representing the types have been combined for calcu-
lation of the error bars which are applied to both MINNs of one type. The 
observed variations of the inherent background values might be the 
result of a specific on-board data processing which subtracts a value 
attributed to this characteristic from each measurement, or of the dif-
ferences in the quality of the GM tubes or the stability of their operation. 
In addition to the long-term exposure to the low background radia-
tion of UDO II described above, four MINNs of different types have been 
randomly picked out for irradiation using collimated Cs-137 gamma ray 
sources with different activities in the UDOII laboratory. The MINNs 
belonged to the types 1, 7, 14 and 16 and can be considered as repre-
sentative for all types in this study because they cover 4 different cate-
gories. The irradiation results were used to perform linear regression 
that is shown in the plots of Fig. 2. The laboratory background 
Ḣ*(10)BG, UDOII was subtracted from the mean values. 
In Table 3 the results for the inherent background values of the four 
MINN types, derived either from long-time measurements or from the 
linear regression of irradiation data both carried out in PTB’s UDOII 
laboratory, are summarized. For all 4 MINN types both results agree 
within the measurement uncertainty. For calculations throughout this 
paper the inherent background values determined by long-term mea-
surements at UDOII will be preferred due to smaller uncertainties for all 
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MINN types. 
2.4. Secondary cosmic radiation (SCR) measurements 
2.4.1. General 
An Environment with negligibly low levels of terrestrial and artificial 
radiation was selected for the determination of the MINN’s response to 
the SCR. Therefore, the measurements were conducted using the PTB 
floating platform on a lake near Brunswick (Germany). The platform is 
made of low Z materials and is positioned at least 100 m from the shore. 
The water’s depth is about 3 m which provides an adequate shielding 
from terrestrial radiation. A negligible portion of the terrestrial 
component (about 1 nSv h− 1 (Saez Vergara et al., 2007)) can still reach 
the platform through the scatterings in the air. The reference value for 
the ambient dose equivalent rate of the SCR on ground, Ḣ*(10)SCR =
(29 ±4) nSv h− 1 is measured using detectors - MUDOS: Muon Dosimetry 
System (Wissmann et al., 2005) - which are installed on the reference 
site for environmental dosimetry on PTB’s premises. and which are 
sensitive to the charged components of the SCR, such as muons and 
electrons. A detailed description of these instruments can be found in 
(Wissmann et al., 2005) and (Neumaier and Dombrowski, 2014). 
During the measurement of the SCR sensitivity, MINNs were spread 
on a platform on top of some large plastic trunks. In many cases the 
reference orientation of the MINNs is not specified by the manufac-
turers. Moreover, in practical use the orientation of the MINNs might be 
arbitrary. A test conducted earlier showed no statistically significant 
difference between the vertical and horizontal MINN orientations for 
measurements of the SCR sensitivity. Therefore, for the current study the 
MINNs were laid out with their front panel (display side) upwards. 
Positioned in such manner, the longer dimensions of GM tubes have 
Fig. 1. Inherent background of individual MINNs (points), measured in the PTB underground laboratory UDO II. The dashed horizontal lines depict the MINN type 
mean values, the solid horizontal line shows the laboratory background level of 1.4 nSvh− 1and the solid vertical lines show categories after Table 2. 
Fig. 2. Linear regression for four MINNs irradiated in UDOII laboratory.  
Table 3 
Inherent background evaluated from linear regression for the four MINNs irra-
diated in UDOII laboratory and comparison with the values received from long- 
term measurements.  
MINN Long-term exposure, μSv/h Linear regression, 
μSv/h 
1 0.0081 ± 0.0012 0.004 ± 0.008 
7 0.0303 ± 0.0026 0.028 ± 0.005 
14 0.0144 ± 0.0012 0.015 ± 0.002 
16 0.0242 ± 0.0014 0.024 ± 0.005  
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been subjected to the incident direction of the particles making up the 
SCR. MINNs with the pancake-shaped sensors were placed with the 
tube’s window facing downwards so that the display is then turned to 
the observer. 
In order to avoid a contribution of the radiation originating from 
human bodies, measurements started only after all participants were 
transported back to the lakeshore. The MINNs were exposed to the SCR 
for 1.5 h. 
Equation (1) can be rewritten for this test as follows: 
ĠMINN = Ṁ + qSCR⋅Ḣ
*
(10)ref , SCR. (3)  
2.4.2. Results 
The results of this test are depicted in Fig. 3. The inherent back-
ground of each individual MINN determined in the previous section has 
been subtracted. 
The MINNs demonstrate the expected behavior of detectors using 
gas-filled sensors (Neumaier and Dombrowski, 2014), (Wissmann et al., 
2005), (Dombrowski et al., 2009). Almost all types have significant 
overresponse for the SCR which mainly consists of particles with high 
energies. Only one type was able to reproduce the reference value of the 
SCR within experimental uncertainty. Remarkably, this MINN type 9 has 
the highest inherent background of all types in this work. 
2.5. Response to different ambient conditions 
The employment of the MINNs under different ambient conditions at 
the measurement location requires the readings to be insensitive to 
temperature and humidity changes. This test was carried out at PTB 
using the climatic cabinet which has the control routine for calibrated 
temperature t and relative humidity rH adjustment. Additionally, the 
investigated dose rate meters were irradiated during the whole test 
period using a Cs-137 gamma source to generate indication in the order 
of a few μSv h− 1 to reduce statistical uncertainty. The temperature range 
specified by the manufacturers was found to be between − 20 ◦C and 
+50 ◦C (max. +60 ◦C). If this was not specified, stable operation was 
expected up to at least +50 ◦C – the temperature that can be reached 
inside a car (even outside in some places) in summer. The relative hu-
midity values were chosen in the range between 50% and 95% (non- 
condensing). 
The test routine consisted of five periods of static ambient conditions 
with continuous changes in between. Each of the conditions was 
maintained for about 4 h, however, only the last hour data was taken for 
the analysis. This was necessary because normally there is a lag in the 
thermalization of the MINN’s interior and the GM’s sensor. The first and 
the last periods were referred to as normal conditions (20 ◦C, 65% rH). 
The MINN’s mean readings at normal conditions Ġn.c. at the beginning of 
the test were used for the validation of the constant configuration of the 
experimental setup during the whole test, e. g. relative position of the 
source and the MINN which can likely be changed by vibrations of the 
climatic cabinet. The results in Fig. 4 are represented as the mean values 
of the MINN’s indication Ġt, rH calculated for a period with nominally 
constant t and rH, normalized by the mean value of the indication Ġn.c.
during the first period of the normal conditions. 
The plot shows groups of bars corresponding to constant test con-
ditions. Three different MINN types of the same manufacturer had 
problems to operate properly at the high temperature of 50 ◦C and 50% 
rH. During their continued operation all the logged results showed 
0 cpm. After the temperature was reduced to 30 ◦C, the instruments 
Fig. 3. a) Mean values of the indication during measurements on the lake platform in comparison with the reference value provided by detectors - MUDOS: Muon 
Dosimetry System (Wissmann et al., 2005) - operated on PTB reference site (long solid line). Long dash lines indicate the uncertainty of the reference value. Short 
dash lines show average values calculated for the MINN types; b) SCR sensitivity factors qSCR of the investigated MINN types calculated with Eq. (1). 
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continued to operate normally. All remaining MINN types show stable 
behavior of the response in the investigated temperature and humidity 
range. At positive temperatures, independent of the humidity values, the 
mean indication of the majority of MINNs coincides with the mean value 
at normal conditions which corresponds to the relative response of the 
unity. 
In terms of the IEC 60846–1 (International Electrotechnical Com-
mission, 2009) standard, the deviation of the indication of a dose rate 
meter in the temperature range between − 10 ◦C and 40 ◦C should not 
exceed − 13% and +18%. In the relative humidity range of up to 85% at 
35 ◦C, the maximum deviations between − 9% and 11% should be 
satisfied. These requirements are fulfilled by all tested and working 
MINN types. 
2.6. Linearity of the response 
2.6.1. General 
The response of a GM sensor is known to have linearity only in a 
limited range of dose rates, mainly due to the dead time effect (Corson 
and Wilson, 1962). In this study, we investigate this characteristic on 
MINNs, applying the procedure described below. 
The MINNs were exposed one by one to the collimated gamma fields 
(Cs-137 or Co-60) in the gamma irradiation laboratories of the partner 
institutions in accordance with ISO 4037-1 standard (ISO 4037–1:2019, 
2019). The ambient dose equivalent rate range was chosen to encompass 
values between 200 nSv ​ h− 1 and 900 μSv ​ h− 1. In Germany, the refer-
ence levels for official intervention (according to the source www.bfs.de, 
last access November 2020) are defined as the effective doses of 10 mSv 
(“Sheltering”) and 100 mSv (“Evacuation”) of the external exposure in 7 
days. These values approximately correspond to the Ḣ*(10) values of 
60 μSv h− 1 and 600 μSv h− 1 and are well covered by the selected 
interval. 
The MINNs and the incident photon field were separated by a PMMA 
plate to establish the secondary charged particles equilibrium. The plate 
was placed close to the test device on the side of the incident photon 
flow. The reference point on the MINN housing and the orientation were 
chosen in accordance with the manufacturer’s specifications. When that 
data was missing, reference orientation was anticipated from its shape 
and presence of the entry window. If the MINN had a window, it was 
directed to the incident photons, otherwise the rear panel of the MINN 
pointed towards the source so that the display would be turned to the 
observer. If the MINN had a selectable shielding, it was set for mea-
surements of the gamma radiation. The duration of the irradiation and 
the acquisition time were selected by each laboratory and for each MINN 
type in such a way as to provide satisfactory statistics– resulting in 
standard deviation around 5% of the mean value or smaller - (e.g., if the 
acquisition time was 1 min, the irradiation time was at least 20 min, 
providing at least 18 measurement points or at least 400 counts at each 
constant ambient dose equivalent rate). Some measurement points 
coincided with the periods of the rise and fall of the ambient dose 
equivalent rate. These points were discarded from the calculations. 
The analysis of the results was carried out from the point of view of 
the IEC 60846-1 standard. Criteria for dosimeters that have to be ful-
filled to pass the formal procedure for certification as the ambient dose 
equivalent rate meter are in particular to be found in this document. 
The relative response r is defined there as the quotient of the 
response R = ĠḢ with Ġ the indicated MINN value, Ḣ = Ḣ
*
(10)Ref the 
reference ambient dose equivalent rate in the adjusted field and the 
reference response R0 = Ġr, 0Ḣr,0 with Ġr, 0 the indicated MINN value at some 





This quantity allows us to eliminate possible inaccuracies of the 
calibration due to inappropriate procedure or variations in character-
istics of the components (electronics or sensor) the instrument is made 
of. 
The ambient dose equivalent rate Ḣ*(10)r, 0 = 10 μSv ​ h− 1 of Cs-137 
quality at the location of the MINN was defined as reference value for 
the linearity test. 
2.6.2. Results 
The 1-min values measured by a dose rate meter over the period of a 
single irradiation were averaged and the background was subtracted. 
The combined uncertainty of the mean was calculated. In the next step, 
the mean values of the four MINNs of the same type were averaged to 
represent the mean value of the MINN type. The maximum combined 
uncertainty of the four MINNs of the same type was used as the uncer-
tainty for the type mean value and, consequently, for the calculation of 
the expanded uncertainty of the relative response with the coverage 
factor of two. The relative response was calculated using Eq. (4). The 
results of r for each MINN type are depicted in the plots of Fig. 5. 
In the IEC 60846-1 document, the allowed deviations of the upper 
and the lower limits of the relative response are set between 22% and 
− 15% (dashed lines), respectively. The MINN types 3–5, 10–15, 17, 18 
satisfy completely the linearity limits in the tested dose rate range. In 
contrast, the MINN types 2, 7, 8, 16 cross the lower limit of the tolerable 
Fig. 4. Result of the climatic test carried out for one device of each MINN type. Three MINN types (12, 13 and 18) measured no radiation at a climatic condition and 
are labeled as “malfunction”. Short vertical dashed lines indicate the MINN types which have not participated in the climatic test. 
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Fig. 5. Relative response of the tested MINN types. Dotted lines depict the upper and lower limits of maximum tolerable deviations of the relative response according 
to IEC 60846–1. 
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linearity region at around 500 μSv⋅h− 1 and the MINN type 6 around 850 
μSv⋅h− 1. Other exceptions are the types 1 and 9, where r falls below the 
lower limit but still satisfies the limits around 200 μSv⋅h− 1 (MINN 1) and 
in the region beginning with 2 μSv⋅h− 1 (MINN 1) or 3 μSv⋅h− 1 (MINN 9) 
upwards. The MINN types 10 and 17 have factory-set limited dose rate 
range (as presented) and have been tested to read zero when operated 
out of this range. 
2.7. Energy response 
2.7.1. General 
This test was conducted using the radiation qualities established 
according to ISO 4037–1 in the laboratories of the participating partner 
institutions. In accordance with IEC 60846, for covering the lower en-
ergy region, the N-Series qualities or Am-241 (MINN types 5, 6, 11, 15) 
were used. For higher energies the collimated photon beams of the nu-
clides Cs-137 and Co-60 have been applied. The ambient dose equivalent 
rate Ḣ*(10)Ref ,0 was maintained at constant value in the range of 
10 μSv⋅h− 1–100 μSv⋅h− 1. The measurement procedure, the positioning 
of the MINNs and the evaluation of the results were the same as applied 
in the linearity test. The Cs-137 served as the reference quality. 
2.7.2. Results 
The data for the final representation was processed by the methods 
described above. In the diagram in Fig. 6 the results from the energy 
response for MINN types are shown. 
For MINN types 5 and 15 the manufacturer recommended readout 
system was used. In this configuration it introduced additional dead 
time which limited measured number of counts, effectively. This effect is 
expected to be more significant when measurements were conducted in 
Am-241 field. 
All the tested MINNs failed the requirements set by IEC 60846-1 by a 
high margin. The behavior of the MINN types is expected as they utilize 
energy uncompensated GM sensors whose efficiency is highly dependent 
on the energy of the incident photons (von Droste, 1937), (YukawaSa-
kata, 1937). The relative response increased up to 11 times (MINN 9) at 
low energies between a few tens of keV up to about 120 keV. 
2.8. Small dose rate changes on top of the natural background radiation 
(plume simulation) 
2.8.1. General 
The MINNs are used for measurements of dose rates produced by 
natural and artificial gamma photon sources. An important feature of 
the radiation fields in the environment is their dispersity and the pres-
ence of a large amount of Compton photons with different energies, i. e. 
scattered from the ground, plants, buildings and in the air. In contrast, 
gamma fields produced in laboratories are collimated and have a well- 
defined direction of incidence and less scattered components. A plume 
simulation test was carried out at PTB to investigate the behavior of the 
MINN types participating in this study under controlled radiological 
conditions in the natural environment close to a real-case scenario – 
flying by of radioactive clouds. 
The location for this test was a meadow on PTB property near the 
neutron dosimetry laboratory building with a proton accelerator and a 
cyclotron inside. The time period for the plume simulation was chosen to 
coincide with the maintenance of the mentioned facilities to avoid their 
impact on the measurements. 
The plume simulation setup (Fig. 7 a) was established to emulate the 
passing of a radioactive plume across the site. The employed in-house 
developed machine can incorporate up to four individual point-like 
gamma sources. It is equipped with different types of shielding used 
for the generation of constant radiation fields which, for dosimetry 
purposes, can be characterized by well-defined dose equivalent rates 
Ḣ*(10) at a fixed distance. The sources are confined inside a lead box 
where they are “inactive”, i.e. no radiation comes out. The source can 
automatically be moved from the lead box to one of the three vertically 
arranged positions where it is surrounded by material with “strong”, 
“weak” and “no” shielding ability. The machine is usually put in place so 
that the gamma source has the central position relative to the test de-
vices which are arranged along the circumference of the circle with 5 m 
radius. 
During the plume simulation, three different point-like sources (Cs- 
137, Co-60, Ra-226) at the three different shielding positions were used 
to generate six dose equivalent rates. The Ra-226 source was put 
manually on top of the plume machine where sources are usually used 
without shielding. At that time, no other source was exposed. 
A secondary standard Reuter Stokes ionization chamber (type RS- 
131) was installed in the circle as reference instrument and operated 
during the test to provide reference Ḣ*(10)ref , art values. It has been 
calibrated in the PTB underground laboratory UDOII with the reference 
values traceable to the primary standard. 
At the beginning of the test, the level of the background dose rate was 
measured for at least 30 min. This was followed by six 30-min periods of 
irradiation with photon fields defined by the combination of the source 
and the shielding type. At the end, the background was measured again. 
The reference values of the dose equivalent rate of the gamma photon 
fields during the plume simulation test including their k = 2 confidence 
intervals are summarized in Table 4. The time periods were taken from 
the protocol of the plume machine, logged automatically by the control 
software. 
In order to ensure that all MINNs have equal test conditions, a special 
fixation has been designed, constructed and provided for all partici-
pants. It consists of eight wooden boards with a length of 2.50 m, fixed 
on two height adjustable tripods distributed along the circle. All MINNs 
are attached to the boards using wooden holders. The radially adjustable 
holders allow shifting the MINNs along the radius to precisely define 
their position relative to the source. The MINNs are positioned in such a 
way that the geometrical middle of their Geiger tubes is about 1 m above 
the ground and 5 m to the source with 20 cm gaps in between. Addi-
tionally, vertical or horizontal orientation of the MINN was possible. For 
some of the types (1, 7, 14, 16) both positions were tested with no sig-
nificant difference. 
During the whole test, all MINNs are permanently running and 
storing data in defined time intervals. It was arranged among the par-
ticipants to set 1 min as the data acquisition time. For some devices it 
was not possible to change this setting - for MINN 9 the acquisition time 
was 5 min. 
For calculations in this section, Eq. (1) can be rewritten as: 
ĠMINN = ĠBG + qart⋅Ḣ
*
(10)ref , art (5)  
with ĠBG = Ṁ + qterr⋅Ḣ
*
(10)ref , terr + qSCR⋅Ḣ
*
(10)ref , SCR the averaged 
MINN indication during the both periods of background measurement. 
2.8.2. Results 
The raw data recorded by the MINN types during their irradiations in 
the plume simulation setup is represented in Fig. 8. 
The inherent background and the contributions to the dose rate 
indication caused by natural radiation have not been subtracted yet. 
This form of measurement data would normally be encountered with a 
typical non-governmental network. 
Almost all MINN data enable one visually to conclude if there is a 
qualitative difference between the background and source measure-
ment, except for the MINN type 10 whose background data and mea-
surement of source 2 are very similar. 
Remarkably, the MINN types 13, 16–18 measure visibly larger (other 
types have similar) dose rates with the source 4 than 3 whereas for the 
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Fig. 6. Energy response of investigated MINN types. The dashed lines between data points serve as the guide to the eye. The dashed straight lines in parallel to x axis 
indicate the lower and upper acceptable deviation limits defined in IEC 60846–1. 
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Ḣ*(10)ref , art values of those photon fields the opposite is valid. This ef-
fect originates in the slightly enhanced sensitivity of the GM sensors to 
the photons with energies larger than 662 keV (Cs-137) as it was shown 
above. 
The MINNs seem to implement no longer-duration averaging 
methods on-board beside the acquisition time when storing the data to 
the memory once per minute. In contrast, for the dose rate displayed on 
the screen the rolling average method is likely to be applied in some of 
the MINN types. As a result, the response time to a change of the ambient 
dose equivalent rate does not exceed the acquisition time for most of the 
MINN types in this study. It can be seen at the good coincidence of the 
beginning and the end of dose rate changes measured by the MINNs and 
by the reference instrument. It was found that the MINN types 8, 10 and 
17 are prone to non-critical data loss. The data loss observed for MINN 
types 5 and 15 during source 6 was due to a power supply fault, not a 
fault with the MINNs. The response of MINN type 11 during exposure to 
source 5 was found to be erratic, with the dose rate dropping sharply 
before recovering over the period of 60 s. This appeared to be consistent 
with the GM tube intermittently losing power. This was most likely a 
fault of the USB hub providing power for the four individual MINNs. 
In comparison with the absolute values of the reference ambient dose 
equivalent rate, the MINN types 1 and 4 demonstrate the best perfor-
mance for the background as well as for the combined background- 
source measurements. The MINN types 5, 7, 8, 11–14, and 17 show 
satisfactory measurement results only for the combined background- 
source measurements and their background readings are slightly 
enhanced. The MINN types 2, 3, 15 and 16 indications are too high and 
MINN types 9 and 10 too low compared with the reference values in this 
test. 
The considered raw readings must be corrected for self-effect or 
inherent background and for overresponse to SCR. Additionally, it 
should be accounted for different sensitivities of GM sensors to the 
terrestrial and artificial sources of radiation according to Eq. (1). How-
ever, in a real case scenario there is a lack of the reference data and Eq. 
(5) can be applied, instead. 
The final values of Ġtype represent the increase of the indication due 
to an artificial source and are given after subtraction of the MINN 
background mean value ĠBG from the mean value calculated from the 
readings taken from one single irradiation period ĠMINN. Then, the mean 
values were averaged within the type. The maximum value of the un-
certainties within the set of four MINNs of the same type was selected. 
This can be justified through the observation that the uncertainties of 
the same MINN type under identical test conditions in this study are 
similar. Furthermore, it was assumed that the uncertainty of an indi-
vidual MINN is representative for the whole type. The results are rep-
resented in Fig. 9. 
The abscissa of Fig. 9 (a) represents the source number which cor-
responds to the one of Table 4. Reference values are shown with an 
Fig. 7. Plume simulation setup for measurements of small dose rate changes in the environment with natural background radiation. The plume machine in the center 
of circle surrounded by measurement instruments (a). Vertically (b) and horizontally (c) positioned MINNs. 
Table 4 
dose rates used during the plume simulation test which are determined by the 
calibrated reference instrument of the type RS-131.  
Nr. Source Ḣ*(10)ref , art, nSv 
h− 1  
ΔḢ*(10)ref , art , (k =
2), nSv h− 1  
timeline 
0 BG 75.8 4.6 11:50:27–12:20:29 
1 Cs-137 236 14 12:22:26–12:52:27 
2 Cs-137 62.0 3.6 12:54:42–13:24:43 
3 Cs-137 131.2 7.5 13:25:26–13:55:28 
4 Co-60 114 2.9 13:57:32–14:27:33 
5 Ra- 
226 
381 14 14:39–15:12 
6 Co-60 164 3.9 15:20:08–15:50:10 
0 BG 75.8 4.6 15:51:12–16:21:12  
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additional solid line over the corresponding MINN type mean values that 
were evaluated by the irradiation with a source. The dashed lines depict 
the upper and the lower values of the confidence interval with the 
coverage factor of 2 belonging to the reference values. On the diagram, 
the MINN types 1, 7, 9–14, 17 and 18 clearly underestimate the dose rate 
generated by the artificial sources. The MINN types 2, 8, 11, 16 
demonstrate a satisfactory performance at sources 4, 6 (Co-60) and 5 
(Ra-226) and underestimate the dose rate at sources 1 and 3 (Cs-137). 
The MINN types 4 and 15 perform well in the Cs-137 photon fields but 
demonstrate an overestimation of the dose rate at Co-60 and Ra-226 
caused radiation. These results can be explained by poor energy 
dependence but also by the deviation from linearity at very low dose rate 
ranges, comparable with natural background. However, most of the 
calculated values for absolute response are within 30% margin around 
the reference values, which can be considered satisfactory based on the 
requirements for energy dependence and linearity given in the relevant 
Fig. 8. Raw measurement data from one MINN of each type irradiated at the plume simulation site. The connected points show 1-min averages of the MINN and the 
solid lines depict combined reference ambient dose equivalent rate values (background and source) corresponding to each irradiation period. 
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standards (IEC 60846–1). 
The diagram in Fig. 9 (b) shows the sensitivity factor of the MINN 
types to the terrestrial radiation qterr calculated with Eq. (1). Most of the 
MINN types in the current study have this factor around or close to unity. 
Finally, in the diagram of Fig. 9 (c) the MINN type sensitivity factor 
qart is evaluated for each of the sources used in the plume simulation. 
Since most of the qart values have their uncertainty intervals overlapping 
at the investigated dose rates it is reasonable to average the values 
belonging to the same MINN type for all six constant ambient dose 
equivalent rate values in this test. As a result, each averaged qart factor 
has the improved uncertainty interval which still encompasses all points 
of each MINN type. One exception is the MINN type 9 at the photon field 
number 5 which demonstrates very low uncertainty at the highest value 
of ambient dose equivalent rate in this test. 
The determination of the characteristic limits - decision threshold 
and detection limit - for the MINN types was not targeted in this study 
and is even not useful at this stage. Moreover, the proper calibration of 
all MINN types in terms of ambient dose rate equivalent is mandatory for 
the appropriate calculation of these figures. The results would be 
misleading otherwise. The investigation of these characteristics could be 
the subject of a separate study or a part of an official calibration 
procedure. 
2.9. Comparison with instruments used in governmental early warning 
networks 
Professional detector systems installed in early warning networks 
participated in intercomparisons at PTB in the past (Neumaier and 
Dombrowski, 2014), (Saez Vergara et al., 2007), (Neumaier et al., 
2000b), (Wissmann and Sáez Vergara, 2006), (Dombrowski et al., 
2009). There are different types of sensors utilized in these instruments 
among them ionization chambers (IC), Geiger-Mueller sensors (GM) and 
proportional counters (PC). 
Data obtained from detectors used in early warning networks are 
usually given as 10-min average of ambient dose equivalent rate. Thus, 
the measurements of a representative MINN of the type 1 during plume 
simulation in from the current study have been averaged to 10-min 
values and plotted together with similar data taken by some profes-
sional instruments from early warning networks during in-
tercomparisons in the past. In the presented data, the contributions 
caused by the naturally occurred radiation and the inherent background 
have been determined and subtracted as the background measurement. 
It should be noted that the plume simulation test was carried out as part 
of this intercomparison using identical equipment and parameters 
(plume simulator, shielding types, distances, sources), however, with 
some dose rate values different than in the past. Results are plotted in 
Fig. 10. 
In previous intercomparisons with systems from governmental net-
works, the 001/IC always served as reference instrument and its data 
Fig. 9. (a) Absolute dose rate values measured by MINN averaged over four devices of the same type. Solid and dashed lines show the reference values and their 
uncertainties. Short vertical lines indicate the missing data for the MINN type 6; (b) response of MINN expressed as the averaged measured dose rate in relation to the 
corresponding reference value calculated with Eq. (1); (c) MINN type sensitivity at the six photon fields generated at the plume simulation site. The six points 
represent the sensitivity of the corresponding MINN type at photon fields 1 to 6, respectively. Solid and dashed lines depict the average of the six mean values and its 
uncertainty interval (gray colored) for each MINN type, respectively. 
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should be considered as reference values. Their timestep has been 
adapted to the MINN timestep. The reference values valid for this MINN 
study are depicted as solid and their confidence intervals as dashed lines. 
The shift in the 10-min representation of the MINN data comes from 
setting the calculation start point to the first 1-min measurement and the 
result was assigned the last 1-min point. The plot shows a noticeable 
discrepancy between governmental instruments and the MINN. Detector 
systems from governmental networks - especially those employing GM 
sensors - show a slight overestimation of the ambient dose equivalent 
rate. However, their indication is more stable during an irradiation 
period. In contrast, the 10-min MINN data shows a significant under-
estimation of the reference values and greater fluctuation at the lowest 
investigated ambient dose equivalent rate values. 
3. Conclusions 
In this comprehensive study of relatively simple, light-weighted and 
cheap dose rate Measurement Instruments used in Non-governmental 
dosimetry Networks (MINNs), 68 detectors in total, were tested in four 
dosimetry laboratories. The two national metrology institutes, PTB and 
NPL and two designated institutions ENEA and VINCA provided irra-
diation facilities with dose rate values traceable to primary standards. 
Using these facilities as well as the unique reference facilities at PTB for 
dosimetry at low dose rates, the most relevant performance parameters 
(detector’s inherent background, energy dependence and linearity of the 
response, sensitivity to secondary cosmic radiation, response to small 
changes of the dose rate, stability of the detector’s reading at various 
climatic conditions) were investigated. 
The results of these investigations reveal that the most serious 
problem of dose rate measurements using these MINNs is their very 
strong energy dependence, which was found for all tested types. In some 
cases, an over-response that exceeds the acceptable upper limits as 
defined in IEC 60846-1 by up to a factor of 6.7 was found. The cause of 
this problem is the use of non-compensated GM tubes with a bad 
inherent energy dependence. This problem could in principle be solved 
by using appropriate energy compensation filters (Kržanović et al., 
2019). The latter could only be done by the MINN-manufacturers but 
certainly not by the laypersons that typically own and operate such 
simple devices. The results of this intercomparison exercise show that 
the calibration factors applied by the manufacturers can deviate 
significantly for some of the systems. Both, the introduction of energy 
compensation filters and correct (traceable) calibrations by the manu-
facturers is strongly recommended, but this would probably lead to an 
increase of the price of such systems, dedicated for citizen science 
networks. 
Concerning the other basic performance parameters: All MINNs 
showed satisfactory inherent background values of the order of a few 
tens of nSv⋅h− 1, and most of them also showed a satisfactory linearity of 
the response for dose rates of up to 100 μSv h− 1 and above. An over-
response to secondary cosmic radiation was found (about 50%), which is 
typical for GM counters. Finally, in a climate cabinet, the dependence of 
the dose rate indication of the MINNs under different climate conditions 
was studied. Concerning their use within the temperature and humidity 
range specified by the manufacturers (typically − 20 ◦C to +40 ◦C and a 
relative humidity between 50% and 95%), with exception of the systems 
of one manufacturer, all other systems showed stable working and no 
significant influence of the readings. In contrary, the malfunctioning 
systems showed no readings at all (0 cpm) and should definitely not be 
used in the natural environment. 
In order to study the sensitivity of the systems to small artificial in-
creases of the dose rate (as caused by a radioactive plume that passes by 
or by contaminations due to a radioactive fallout), the MINNs were 
exposed to a natural radiation environment at PTB, superimposed by 
weak radiation fields, generated by various radioactive sources. All 
MINN types, except for one, showed a statistically significant increase of 
the count rates, even for a moderate increase of 60 nSv h− 1 (i.e. about 
the same order of magnitude as the natural background radiation at sea 
level). This means, that MINNs would be able to detect relevant dose 
rate increases, as typical for accidents with massive release of radioac-
tivity. The MINNs investigated, typically comprise GM tubes featuring 
small dimensions, which means that longer integrations times are 
necessary for reasonable statistics, but, on the other hand, lead to a less 
pronounced angular dependence of the response. Nevertheless, inap-
propriate location or orientation of the MINNs (e.g. indoors or near to 
buildings or inside of cars) may significantly influence their dose rate 
readings. 
None of the tested MINN types fully conforms with the relevant 
dosimetric standards and they all show inferior performance when 
compared with dedicated dosimeters used by governmental networks. 
Nevertheless, in case of nuclear or radiological emergency, the possibly 
large amount of data obtained by non-governmental networks (NRMNs) 
using MINNs could presumably be used to track radioactive plumes and 
to detect radioactive contaminations. Both provide extremely relevant 
information for radiation protection measures of the local authorities, 
national governments and the European Commission. However, such 
information based on non-governmental measurements using MINNs 
should be used with great precautions, considering the possibility of 
reporting of faked data or of malfunctioning MINNs. In addition, the 
Fig. 10. Comparison of plume simulation data of current MINN intercomparison and of the instruments used in governmental networks taken during previous 
intercomparisons at PTB in the years 2009, 2012 and 2016. 
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NRMNs are sometimes not able to keep the data up to date, due to 
manual data up-load. 
Therefore, comparison with other nearby MINNs and with data from 
stationary or mobile governmental detector systems will be a prereq-
uisite for an appropriate quality assurance. 
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impact of typhoons on sediment connectivity: lessons learnt from contaminated 
coastal catchments of the Fukushima Prefecture (Japan). Earth Surf. Process. 
Landforms 42, 306–317. 
Coletti, M., Hultquist, C., Kennedy, W.G., Cervone, G., 2017. Validating safecast data by 
comparisons to a U. S. Department of energy Fukushima prefecture aerial survey. 
J. Environ. Radioact. 171. 
Corson, D.R., Wilson, R.R., 1962. Particle and quantum counters. Rev. Sci. Instrum. 19, 
207–233. 
Dombrowski, H., Neumaier, S., Thompson, I.M.G., Wissmann, F., 2009. EURADOS 
intercomparison 2006 to harmonize European early warning dosimetry systems. 
Radiat. Protect. Dosim. 135, 1. 
Gonze, M.A., Calmon, P., 2017. Meta-analysis of radiocesium contamination data in 
Japanese forest trees over the period 2011–2013. Sci. Total Environ. 601/602, 
301–316. 
http://www.preparedness-empir.eu/. (Accessed 1 August 2020). 
Hultquist, C., Cervone, G., 2018. Comparison of simulated radioactive atmospheric 
releases to citizen science observations for the Fukushima nuclear accident. Atmos. 
Environ. 198, 478–488. 
International Electrotechnical Commission, 2009. Radiation Protection Instrumentation - 
Ambient And/or Directional Dose Equivalent (Rate) Meters And/or Monitors for Beta, X 
and Gamma Radiation - Part 1: Portable Workplace And Environmental Meters And 
Monitors. IEC 60846-1.  
International Organization for Standardization, 1995. “Guide To the Expression of 
Uncertainty in Measurement”, Report ISO/DGuide 99998. ISO), Geneva.  
Iso 4037-1:2019, 2019. Radiological Protection — X and Gamma Reference Radiation for 
Calibrating Dosemeters and Doserate Meters and for Determining Their Response as 
a Function of Photon Energy — Part 1: Radiation Characteristics and Production 
Methods. 
Iurlaro, G., et al., 2018a. Monitoring of Ionising Radiation by Non-governmental 
Networks in the Framework of the Empir - 16env04 “Preparedness” Project, Book of 
Abstract 4th NERIS Workshop, “Adapting Nuclear and Radiological Emergency 
Preparedness, Response and Recovery to a Changing World”, p. 54. 
Iurlaro, G., et al., 2018b. “Environmental Measurements of Radioactivity and Radiation 
Protection Quantity Available in Non-governmental Network Web Sites”, Book of 
Abstract 3rd European Radiation Protection Week 2018, pp. 110–111. https://erpw 
2018.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ERPW-abstracts-book_web_pages.pdf. 
(Accessed 1 August 2020). 
Komissarov, M.A., Ogura, S., 2017. Distribution and migration of radiocesium in sloping 
landscapes three years after the Fukushima-1 nuclear accident. Eurasian Soil Sci. 50, 
861–871. 
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